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Two models of a queue are proposed: a human queue and two lines of vehicles before a narrowing.
In both models, a queuer tries to evaluate his waiting time, taking into account the delay caused
by intruders who jump to the queue front. As the collected statistics of such events is very limited,
the evaluation can give very long times. The results provide an example, when direct observations
should be supplemented by an inference from the context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In sociology, theorems are formulated rather rarely;
the Thomas theorem is such an exception [1]. The
theorem states: ’if men define situations as real, they
are real in their consequences’ [2]. This reference to
human mind, ubiquitous as it is in social sciences, seems
to deserve more attention in sociophysical papers, where
the first principle is to keep the model simple. (For the
discussion of advantages and drawbacks of this principle
we refer to [3].) Here we are going to reproduce the way
of thinking of a rational agent who is not able to infer
from a context; instead, he defines the situation as it
appears from direct observations. The problem is that
the data he can acquire in a short time are limited to
one or two numbers, while a proper decision should be
based on a much larger statistics. Yet, for some reasons
he is willing to take decision at once. We ask, what can
he deduce from limited data?
Inference of this kind, although regular in real life,
is rarely considered in scientific papers, with [4] as
an exception. The so-called German tank problem [5]
bears also some resemblance to this concept. Yet, the
ground is prepared by the idea of evolutionary game
theory [6–8], where agents decide on the basis of an
incomplete information. For games, the list of possible
strategies is set by the definition of a given game.
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Here, this knowledge is substituted by a formulation
of a model of the time evolution of a given system.
The task of an agent is to evaluate the model parameters.
As an example of a social system, here we consider
a queue. This example is by no means new. Not
pretending to a completeness, we provide a few examples
of experimental papers. In a study on a long, overnight
queue for football tickets in Melbourne, Leon Mann
indicates that this queue is ’a miniature social system
(...), formulating its own informal rules’ [9]. Two such
rules have been identified there: i) first come, first
served, called ’a fundamental concept of queueing’, and
ii) the right of a temporal absence, necessary in long
queues. In [10], a cognitive bias towards unjustified
optimism has been identified in the same Melbourne
queue at persons with little chances to get the tickets.
Various methods of norm executions in queues have been
classified by Stanley Milgram and colleagues in [11].
Ellen Langer has investigated the level of ’mindlessness’
in queues: as she demonstrated, people accept jumping
to the queue front when requested, even if the request is
formulated in a nonsensical way [12, 13].
Here we propose to consider two simple models of
the situation where a queuer observes that somebody
jumps to the queue front. The queuer tries to evaluate
his expected time of waiting, taking into account the
estimated frequency of the jumping. These evaluations
are to be performed on the basis of the observed data;
yet these data are assumed here to be limited to one or
two observations. In both models, the queuer is able
to perform some calculations or simulations; here we
assume that the results of these simulations is all what
he can have. In other words, the queuer does not try
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2to infer from the context: the physical or mental state
of other queuers, publicly accessible opinions on waiting
time and so on. To be more specific, we can assume that
the queuer relies on an application at his smartphone,
which is able to evaluate the time of waiting in a queue
in the presence of intruders.
In two subsequent sections, two models are presented:
one of a queue of persons, and another one of two lines
of vehicles before a street narrowing. For both models,
the waiting time is found numerically, either as a func-
tion of the model parameters or at least in the form of
the probability distribution. In both cases, the results
indicate that the evaluation can give very large values
of the waiting time. The last section is devoted to the
discussion of an expected human reaction to the result.
II. A HUMAN QUEUE
Suppose that an agent arrives to a queue for a taxi
at an airport and mounts at its end. According to his
expectation, the waiting time is just the product of the
queue length n and the mean time t between arrivals
of two subsequent vehicles. This evaluation ceases,
however, its validity if the observer sees an intruder who
jumps to the queue front and takes an arriving taxi.
Why he is allowed to do so? Perhaps it is because his
military uniform? wonders our queuer, strange in the
new country. Will others appear like that? How often?
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FIG. 1: The histogram of waiting times τ for a human queue,
obtained with the algorithm in Section II for a=2,3,5. The
probabilities of negative τ for these values of a, obtained with
the same algorithm, are 0.33, 0.25 and 0.17, respectively. The
slope of the curve tail is close to -1 (note the different bases
of logarithms for the axis).
If the mean time between intruders is t′, the waiting
time τ can be found from
τ
t
= n+
τ
t′
, (1)
where the ratio τ/t′ is the expected number of intruders
during the time τ . Then,
τ =
ntt′
t′ − t (2)
The value of the latter expression heavily depends on the
observed difference t′−t, and it can be arbitrarily large if
the observed t′ is close to t. Actually, it is even possible
that τ < 0, which means that an intruder is observed
earlier, than a taxi. Provided that both these times are
exponentially distributed, < t >= 1/a and < t′ >= 1,
the probability of such an event is
P (t′ < t) = a
∫ ∞
0
dte−at
∫ t
0
dt′e−t
′
=
1
1 + a
(3)
With this probability, the application gives an infinite
waiting time. Putting this strange result aside, we
calculate the probability distribution of the waiting
time. The proposed algorithm is as follows:
1. Find a few random moments t(i) with the exponen-
tial pdf (probability density function) with < t(i) >= 1
(n-th time when somebody leaves is a sum of first n
moments)
2. Find a random moment t′ when the intruder
appears, also with the exponential pdf with < t′ >= a,
where a > 1
3. Find t as the mean t(i) from the events t(i) with
the sum smaller than t′
4. Apply Eq. (2) to calculate τ/n; if the result is
negative, add 1 to the ’number of negative results’. If
τ > 0, add the result to the histogram of (τ).
The results on the number of negative results coincide
nicely with the Eq. (3) for a= 2, 3 and 5. The histogram
obtained for τ > 0 and the statistics of 107 runs is shown
in Fig. 1. As we see, the result is scale-free. This means,
that very long waiting times are possible.
III. QUEUE OF TWO LINES OF VEHICLES
Suppose that two lines of vehicles wait before a street
narrowing. To pass the narrowing, vehicles in the left
line have only to reach it. On the contrary, vehicles
in the right line have additionally to change the line,
because the narrowing blocks their line. Each time
3when a vehicle in the left line passes the narrowing,
a gap opens in the left line between the car which
moves and the car immediately behind. If a car from
the right line profits the gap and changes the line, the
cars in the left line behind him do not move at all; the
chance is lost till the next time. The longer the queue,
the smaller the chance to move for the cars in the left line.
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FIG. 2: Time dependence of P (0) for the queue of vehicles.
This probability, multiplied by q at the next time step, is a
measure of the vehicle probability flow over the narrowing.
The parameter p = 1 − q is the probability that a vehicle of
the right line enters to a gap.
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FIG. 3: The mean waiting time of vehicles, as dependent on
the parameter q = 1− p. For q = 1, the waiting time τ = n.
However, as p increases, τ can increase to astronomical values.
Consider the time-dependent probability Pt(n) that at
time t, n vehicles are between a given car and the nar-
rowing in the left line. Let us also denote by p = 1 − q
the probability that a car from the right line enters into
a moving hole. The appropriate Master equation is
Pt+1(n) = Pt(n)(1− q)
n∑
k=0
qk + Pt(n+ 1)q
n+2 (4)
The first term on the r.h.s. of this equation is related to
all possible events which prevent our car in the left line
to move. This can happen at each of n positions of the
gap; yet, once occupied, the gap disappears. The second
term is related to a successful move of our vehicles from
the n + 1-th position to the n-th position. This needs
the passive reaction of all n + 2 vehicles, which can be
realized in only one way. Summing up the first term, we
get
Pt+1(n) = Pt(n)(1− qn+1) + Pt(n+ 1)qn+2 (5)
The mean waiting time can be calculated as
τ(n, q) = q
∞∑
t=0
(t+ 1)Pt(0) (6)
as it measures the current of probability of vehicles
through the narrowing at time t, summarized over t. In
Fig. 2, we show the time dependence of the probability
P (0) that our vehicle appears just before the narrowing.
The mean waiting time τ , calculated numerically for
different n and q, is shown in Fig. 3. It is clear that
once q = 1, the waiting time is just τ = n. Yet, for
small q the waiting time τ appears to grow without limits.
IV. DISCUSSION
What kind of reaction for such a pessimistic result
we can expect? We have no data related directly to
our problem, yet some analogy can be drawn with an
expected reaction for a deterioration of conditions of a
job. According to Albert Hirschman, active options are
’exit or voice’, with loyalty or neglect as passive ones
[14, 15]. For a human queue, the active options remain
valid, while it might not be possible to exit from a traffic
jam. The strategy ’voice’ can be further differentiated
to distinguish between an attempt to negotiate and a
pure aggression.
Coming back to the option of inference from the
context, we note that yet another option is to reject
the result. One can say to himself: ’if it had looked
like that, someone would have reacted’. This can be
chosen more likely and is more justified, because -
according to our assumptions - the inference has been
based on an incomplete information. However, other
factors can play a role at least not less important.
As indicated above, when we are placed at the end
of a queue which is apparently too long to provide
goods, we are prone to an unjustified optimism [10].
This experimental result coincides with a more recent
research of attitudes of beginners in business: they
are found to see only positive examples and to have
an illusion of control of their life [16]. It remains not
4clear, if this optimism is induced by the situation or
if the beginners in business are optimistic by their nature.
Summarizing, we have considered two examples of
model queues within the more general frames of the prob-
lem of inference from very limited data. We demon-
strated that for both models, it may happen that the
evaluated waiting time is extremely long. In our opin-
ion, in everyday life such evaluations are usually verified
on the basis of context. In reality both social situations
provide a cognitive infrastructure in which according to
Krueger [17] we are able to address personal attitudes,
social norms, self-efficacy and collective efficacy. On the
contrary, this kind of results can influence actions of AI
systems, where an inference from context is not readily
available.
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